# First Off

**A. Interpretation – economic engagement requires expanding bilateral economic relations**

**Kahler, 6** - Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego (M., “Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies on the Korean Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait” in Journal of Peace Research (2006), 43:5, p. 523-541, Sage Publications)

Economic engagement - a policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with an adversary in order to change the behavior of the target state and improve bilateral political relations - is a subject of growing interest in international relations. Most research on economic statecraft emphasizes coercive policies such as economic sanctions. This emphasis on negative forms of economic statecraft is not without justification: the use of economic sanctions is widespread and well documented, and several quantitative studies have shown that adversarial relations between countries tend to correspond to reduced, rather than enhanced, levels of trade (Gowa, 1994; Pollins, 1989). At the same time, however, relatively little is known about how often strategies of economic engagement are deployed: scholars disagree on this point, in part because no database cataloging instances of positive economic statecraft exists (Mastanduno, 2003). Beginning with the classic work of Hirschman (1945), most studies of economic engagement have been limited to the policies of great powers (Mastanduno, 1992; Davis, 1999; Skalnes, 2000; Papayoanou & Kastner, 1999/2000; Copeland, 1999/2000; Abdelal & Kirshner, 1999/2000). However, engagement policies adopted by South Korea and one other state examined in this study, Taiwan, demonstrate that engagement is not a strategy limited to the domain of great power politics and that it may be more widespread than previously recognized.

**This means the plan has to be government-to-government – not private economic engagement**

**Daga, 13** - director of research at Politicas Publicas para la Libertad, in Bolivia, and a visiting senior policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation (Sergio, “Economics of the 2013-2014 Debate Topic:

U.S. Economic Engagement Toward Cuba, Mexico or Venezuela”, National Center for Policy Analysis, 5/15, <http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/Message_to_Debaters_6-7-13.pdf>)

Economic engagement between or among countries can take many forms, but this document will focus on government-to-government engagement through 1) international trade agreements designed to lower barriers to trade; and 2) government foreign aid; next, we will contrast government-to-government economic engagement with private economic engagement through 3) international investment, called foreign direct investment; and 4) remittances and migration by individuals. All of these areas are important with respect to the countries mentioned in the debate resolution; however, when discussing economic engagement by the U.S. federal government, some issues are more important with respect to some countries than to others.

Violation- the BECC is a private compay

Voter:

Predictable Limits

Precision

# Next off

#### CP Text: The United States Federal Government should consult Brazil on providing renewable energy assistance to Mexico

**Prior binding consultation key to U.S.-Brazilian relations.**

**Einaudi, 11**—a Distinguished Visiting f ellow in the Center for Strategic r esearch, i nstitute for n ational Strategic Studies, at the n ational Defense University. He is also a Member of the a dvisory Council of the Brazil i nstitute at the Woodrow Wilson i nternational Center for Scholars. (Luigi, “Brazil and the United States: The Need for Strategic Engagement,” March 2011, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/SF%20266%20Einaudi.pdf //BLOV)

A prerequisite for improved mutual engagement will be changes in perspective on both sides. Mutually beneficial engagement requires the United States to welcome Brazil’s emergence as a global power. Brazil is more than a tropical China35; it is culturally and politically close to the United States and Europe. Brazil, in turn, needs to realize that the United States accepts its rise. Brazil also needs to recognize that the United States still matters greatly to Brasilia and that more can be achieved work¬ing with Washington than against it.

The United States and Brazil have vast overlapping in-terests, but a formal strategic partnership is probably out of the question for both countries. In the United States, Brazil must compete for policy attention with China, India, Rus-sia, Japan, Mexico, and several European countries. It poses no security threat to the United States. Moreover, despite Brazil’s importance in multilateral organizations, particu¬larly the UN, Brazil can be of limited practical assistance at best to the United States in its two current wars. Brazil’s interests, in turn, may be fairly said to include the need to distinguish itself from the United States. Diplomatically, this means neither country can expect automatic agreement from the other. Interests differ and it may be politically nec¬essary to highlight differences even when interests are simi-lar. But both countries should make every effort to develop a habit of “permanent consultation” in an effort to coordinate policies, work pragmatically together where interests are common, and reduce surprises even while recognizing that specific interests and policies often may differ.

A first operational step, therefore, is for both coun-tries to hold regular policy-level consultations, increase exchanges of information, and coordinate carefully on multilateral matters. This is much easier said than done. The list of global issues on which Brazil is becoming a major player includes conflict resolution, all aspects of energy, including nuclear matters, all types of trade, the environment, space, and the development of internation¬al law, including law of the seas and nonproliferation. To share information and ensure effective consultation on so many functional issues will require finding ways to lessen the geographic stovepiping natural to bureaucracy. The U.S. Department of State, for example, has historically organized itself into geographical bureaus responsible for relations with countries in particular regions, leaving functional issues to offices organized globally. This orga¬nization hampers the exchange of information and con¬sultation with countries such as Brazil, whose reach and policies go beyond their particular geographic region. One result is that multilateral affairs are still often an isolated afterthought in the U.S. Government. Are there things the United States and Brazil could do, whether bi¬laterally or in the World Trade Organization, that would offset some of the negative effects of the China trade on manufacturing in both their countries?36 Just posing the question reveals the complexity of the task.

**Brazil will say yes to climate change mitigation**

Sweig et al 11 (Julia E. Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies, AND Samuel W. Bodman, and James D. Wolfensohn, Chairmen, Wolfensohn & Company, LLC) (“Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations” Council on Foreign Relations Task Force Report, July 12, 2011, http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Brazil\_TFR\_66.pdf //BLOV)

CLIMATE CHANGE

Brazil’s economic success has brought both environmental benefits and challenges. Rising living standards have made environmental protec¬tion more of a priority for both the public and the government. At the same time, however, economic growth has brought higher consump¬tion of goods and energy, as well as greater changes in land use to sup-port agricultural expansion.

Brazil’s continued economic rise will increase threats to its environ¬ment even as its economic wherewithal to address those threats grows. For example, Brazil’s growing electricity demand drives greater use of natural-gas-fired power generation and a growing automobile fleet increases gasoline and diesel demand. Development of the pre-salt oil resources risks acute environmental damage as well, as a major accident could damage Brazil’s “blue Amazon.” Deforestation of the Amazon rainforest, though generally on the decline, remains a major challenge and the primary source of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in Brazil. Conclusions The Rousseff administration’s efforts to mitigate GHG emissions and international efforts to strengthen global commitments to combat climate change will likely come second to Brazil’s higher priorities of economic growth and social development. Nevertheless, many areas of climate change mitigation are of mutual interest to Brazil and the United States, opening significant opportunities for cooperation.

**Co-operation is key to solve amazon deforestation- models and data gathering**

Sweig et al 11 (Julia E. Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies, AND Samuel W. Bodman, and James D. Wolfensohn, Chairmen, Wolfensohn & Company, LLC) (“Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations” Council on Foreign Relations Task Force Report, July 12, 2011, http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Brazil\_TFR\_66.pdf //BLOV)

The Task Force recognizes that the importance and complexity of the Amazon suggest it should be managed comprehensively, coordinat¬ing all relevant parties to help preserve it from climate change, defor¬estation, and fire. As a steward of the largest share of the Amazon and as the largest economy in the region, Brazil has a natural role in lead¬ing cooperation across cultures, political jurisdictions, research disci¬plines, and industries. The Task Force recommends the United States, where possible, use its voice in international financial institutions and other multilateral settings to help mobilize resources that can support Brazil’s coordination.

There is ample scope for the United States and Brazil to work together to improve climate modeling and data gathering capabilities, particularly in the Amazon region. Current climate forecasting models inadequately model the potential consequences of climate change on the Amazon rainforest and other Brazilian ecosystems. Brazil has established a number of international research groups and programs to improve global understanding of the Amazon, its role in regulating the global climate, and its vulnerability to climate change.

The Task Force encourages greater U.S. support for and collabo¬ration with Brazil’s programs that monitor deforestation and climate change, which advance understanding of Brazil’s complex ecosystems and improve the utility of global climate models in general. These programs include: the Large-scale Biosphere-Atmosphere Experi¬ment in Amazonia, a program focused on understanding the role of the Amazon in global environmental change; the National Institute for Space Research’s (INPE) various real-time space- and land-based deforestation monitoring systems; regional and global climate models being jointly developed by Brazil and South Africa; and the Predic-tion and Research Moored Array in the Tropical Atlantic, which stud¬ies ocean-atmosphere interactions. These bilateral efforts would help further Brazil’s space-related science and technology ambitions while addressing deforestation and climate change and the relationship between them. The U.S.-Brazil biofuels memorandum of understand¬ing (MOU) is a good example of both countries jointly promoting the adoption of climate-friendly technologies in third countries, though execution could be strengthened. The Task Force encourages the devel¬opment of similar efforts to reduce deforestation, such as the Bolsa Flo-resta conservation program, in third-party countries.

**Solves deforestation**

Meyer 13 (Peter J. Meyer Analyst in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research Service) (“CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Brazil-U.S. Relations” February 27, 2013, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33456.pdf> //BLOV)

**The Amazon basin spans the borders of eight countries and is the most biodiverse tract of tropical rainforest in the World.** It holds 20% of the Earth’s fresh water and 10% of all known species. **The Amazon also holds 10% of the World’s carbon stores and absorbs nearly 2 billion tons of carbon dioxide each year, making it an sink for global carbon emissions and an important asset in the mitigation of climate change. Approximately 60% of the Amazon falls within Brazilian borders, making Brazil home to 40% of the World’s remaining tropical forests.l**59 The Brazilian Amazon was largely undeveloped u11til the 1960s, when the military government began subsidizing the settlement and development of the region as a matter of national security. The human population grew from 6 million in 1960 to 25 million i11 2010, and approximately 20% of the Brazilian Amazon has now been deforested as a result of settlements, roads, logging, farming and other activities.” Recognizing that continued destruction of the Amazon is damaging to Brazil’s global image and could threaten energy generation and agricultural production in the l'lI[ll1`€,161 the Brazilian government has implemented a series of policies designed to slow deforestation. For example, the Lula and Rousseff Administrations have significantly expanded the couut1y’s nature reserves, bringing Brazil’s total area of protected land to nearly 300,000 square miles.162 Likewise, **the Brazilian government adopted a plan to reduce the rate of Amazon deforestation by half-based on the 1996-2005 average-to 2,300 square miles per year by 2017 and reduce Amazon deforestation by 80% by 2020.** To meet these targets, the Brazilian government is increasing surveillance, replanting over 21,000 square miles of forest, and financing sustainable development projects in areas where the local economy depends on logging. 163 Brazil appears to be on track to achieve its goals, as annual deforestation has fallen from about 10,700 square miles in 2004 to about 2,500 square miles i11 2011.164 There is considerable debate as to whether these decreases are the result of government policies or changing economic circumstances, such as lower commodity p1`lC€S. One recent study, which examined deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon between 2005 and 2009, found that about half of the reduction in deforestation was attributable to the Brazilian governments conservation policies.”

decreases are the result of government policies or changing economic circumstances, such as lower commodity p1`lC€S. One recent study, which examined deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon between 2005 and 2009, found that about half of the reduction in deforestation was attributable to the Brazilian governments conservation policies.”**Some environmentalists are concerned that government policy changes may halt or even reverse Brazil’s recent progress in reducing deforestation.** In December 2011, President Rousseff signed a law transferring responsibility for environmental oversight of non-federal lands from Brazil’s federal environmental agency to local officials. **While the federal government maintains that local officials are better placed to manage such resources, critics argue that local authorities lack the necessary finances and are more susceptible to intimidation and conuption**\_166 **Many environmentalists are also concerned about changes to Brazil’s forest code-an law that requires rural landowners to set aside 20%- 80% of their land for natural vegetation.** The Brazilian Congress approved a maj or overhaul of the code in April 2012. Although President Rousseff vetoed some of the most controversial provisions, the linal version relaxes conservation requirements for environmentally sensitive areas like iiver banks, reduces reforestation requirements for land that has already been deforested, and decreases the total amount of forest that must be preselvedm Suppoiters of the refoim asseit that it is necessary in order to bring farmers into compliance with the law, and argue mat the updated forest code remains among the strictest regulations of privately-owned prope11y in the world.

In August 2010, **the United States and Brazil signed a debt-for-nal1u'e agreement under me Tropical Forest Conservation Act of 2008 (**P.L. 105-214). **According to the agreement, the United States will reduce Brazil’s debt payments by $21 million over tive years. In exchange, the Brazilian government will commit those funds to activities to conserve protected areas, improve natural resource management, and develop sustainable livelihoods in endangered areas outside of the Amazon such as the Atlantic Rainforest, Caatinga, and Cerrado ecosystems**

# Next off

#### Chinese engagement with Latin America is high and stabilizing – increased US engagement will trade-off with Chinese involvement

Watson 09 Professor of Strategy at National War College [Cynthia A. Watson, U.S. Responses to China’s Growing Interests in Latin America: Dawning Recognition of a Changing Hemisphere, “Enter the Dragon? China’s Presence in Latin America”, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf]

CONCLUSIONS

Beijing probably might not have increased its role in Latin America had the Middle East not been a major distraction for Washington over the past fi ve and a half years. Washington has wanted Beijing to modernize its economy. This was bound to create more economic, diplomatic, and trade prowess for China as it has reached beyond the isolationism of the Cultural Revolution, particularly in the newly globalized world. In many ways, Beijing’s increased involvement in Latin America reflects the unanticipated consequence of getting what the West hoped for from China.

But, the inability of Washington to consider anything beyond the concerns about terrorism spreading around the world, and trying to salvage a peace of some sort without nuclear weapons in the Middle East, is having consequences for U.S. interests in other parts of the world. For cultural and geographic reasons, the ties between the United States and Latin America ought to be stronger than those between China and the Latins. Expectations of the strength of Latin America–U.S. ties have probably always been unrealistic and frankly ahistorical; the two parts of the world actually have a number of fundamental differences. But the distance between Latin America’s experiences and those of China are even vaster, ranging from religion to ethnic homogeneity to historical roles in the world. Washington must make a more concerted effort to act as a genuine partner with the region, rather than relegating it to the position of secondary or tertiary thought that assumes absolute U.S. leadership.

The United States and China claim that each is serious about adopting the economic philosophy that undergirds capitalism: economic growth is a net benefit for all, not a zero sum game. If true, China, Latin America, and the United States benefit from the greater Chinese engagement in this region because it creates competition. Pure economic theory, however, always runs up against political philosophies, leading to trade conflicts, protectionism, and all-too-often a zero sum view based on the international relations theory of realpolitik: what’s good for my adversary must be bad for me.

The risks of arousing realpolitik in the United States, particularly as the nation faces increased frustration with the reality of the Middle East, is significant, probably more than the PRC bargained for when it began engaging more with Latin America over the past decade. It appears unlikely that Beijing will seriously accelerate its involvement in the region because of the number of Congressional hearings, public conferences and assessments, and other warnings alerting the United States to China having discovered Latin America. To accelerate its involvement would risk the relatively strong relations with Washington at a time when other trade problems and overall concerns about China’s growing power are already rising in the United States.

At the same time, Washington’s ability to focus equally on all areas of the world is not possible. With U.S. interests directed elsewhere, it seems highly likely that Beijing will be able to maintain the level of involvement in the region it already has, without Washington raising too great a ruckus. Indeed, Beijing’s best outcome from its current balance of involvement in the area is probably going to be the long-term development of trust and ties over several decades with the leaders of this region, rather than immediately creating crucial, highly public ties between itself and Latin American leaders. As so often appears true in the international system, probably the old tale of the tortoise and hare applies here, where China’s biggest gain will be accomplished over a long time of getting to know the region, rather than showing up repeatedly in the ‘rock star’ role which is too soon and too rash for a long-term, stable set of ties. Washington seems likely to worry about the rock star phenomenon, rather than attempting to manage the emergence of another state becoming a long-term partner with its Latin American neighbors.

#### Chinese lead in Latin American economies are vital to maintain their economic growth.

Arnson et al. ‘9(Cynthia Anderson, Mark Mohr, Riordan Roett, writers for Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, “Enter the Dragon? China’s Presence in Latin America”, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf>) (JN)

China’s role in Latin America is, above all, based on trade, despite U.S. concerns about China’s military inﬂuence in Latin America. The major exception to this rule is Cuba, for which China represents a political relationship as well as one based on economic interests. Although Venezuelan authorities may also prefer that its relationship with China have political as well as economic dimensions, it is not clear that China has the same expectations of its relationship with Venezuela. To China, Latin America represents a signiﬁcant source of the necessary natural resources that will help China maintain its economic growth. Due primarily to trade with China, Latin America’s trade volume grew from $2.8 billion in 1988 to $49 billion in 2005. Also, and as publicly announced, China intends to surpass $180 billion in trade with Latin America by 2010, not only due to the country’s need for natural resources, but also as a result of China’s intention to diversify and expand its markets in the region. Thus, Latin America represents a substantial market for Chinese goods.

#### Sustained economic growth prevents social unrest that would collapse the ruling party – that would cause great power war.

**Kane 01** [Thomas Kane, PhD in Security Studies from the University of Hull & Lawrence Serewicz, Autumn, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/01autumn/Kane.htm>]

Despite China's problems with its food supply, the Chinese do not appear to be in danger of widespread starvation. Nevertheless, one cannot rule out the prospect entirely, especially if the earth's climate actually is getting warmer. The consequences of general famine in a country with over a billion people clearly would be catastrophic. The effects of oil shortages and industrial stagnation would be less lurid, but economic collapse would endanger China's political stability whether that collapse came with a bang or a whimper. PRC society has become dangerously fractured. As the coastal cities grow richer and more cosmopolitan while the rural inland provinces grow poorer, the political interests of the two regions become ever less compatible. Increasing the prospects for division yet further, Deng Xiaoping's administrative reforms have strengthened regional potentates at the expense of central authority. As Kent Calder observes, In part, this change [erosion of power at the center] is a conscious devolution, initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1991 to outflank conservative opponents of economic reforms in Beijing nomenclature. But devolution has fed on itself, spurred by the natural desire of local authorities in the affluent and increasingly powerful coastal provinces to appropriate more and more of the fruits of growth to themselves alone.[ 49] Other social and economic developments deepen the rifts in Chinese society. The one-child policy, for instance, is disrupting traditional family life, with unknowable consequences for Chinese mores and social cohesion.[ 50] As families resort to abortion or infanticide to ensure that their one child is a son, the population may come to include an unprecedented preponderance of young, single men. If common gender prejudices have any basis in fact, these males are unlikely to be a source of social stability. Under these circumstances, China is vulnerable to unrest of many kinds. Unemployment or severe hardship, not to mention actual starvation, could easily trigger popular uprisings. Provincial leaders might be tempted to secede, perhaps openly or perhaps by quietly ceasing to obey Beijing's directives. China's leaders, in turn, might adopt drastic measures to forestall such developments. If faced with internal strife, supporters of China's existing regime may return to a more overt form of communist dictatorship. The PRC has, after all, oscillated between experimentation and orthodoxy continually throughout its existence. Spectacular examples include Mao's Hundred Flowers campaign and the return to conventional Marxism-Leninism after the leftist experiments of the Cultural Revolution, but the process continued throughout the 1980s, when the Chinese referred to it as the "fang-shou cycle." (Fang means to loosen one's grip; shou means to tighten it.)[ 51] If order broke down, the Chinese would not be the only people to suffer. Civil unrest in the PRC would disrupt trade relationships, send refugees flowing across borders, and force outside powers to consider intervention. If different countries chose to intervene on different sides, China's struggle could lead to major war. In a less apocalyptic but still grim scenario, China's government might try to ward off its demise by attacking adjacent countries.

# Next off

Next off is the critiscism-

**The notion that we can innovate our way out of climate change only reinforces ontological modes of being that exploit the Earth and constrain its possibilities.**

**Joronen 11** (Mikko, Dept. of Geography, U. of Turku, Finland, “Dwelling in the Sites of Finitude: Resisting the Violence of the Metaphysical Globe,” Antipode, 0(0).)

Perhaps one of the most striking examples of the need for nonviolent resistance and power-free following of the abyssal earth is the contemporary event of global warming. While this devastating change is affecting all parts of the earth, even the atmosphere, some of the most vulgar solutions, especially the geo-engineering proposals, aim at intentional, even global-scale, climate modification either by reducing the incoming radiation from the sun—for instance, by using the refractive screens or sunshade of autonomous spacecraft installed in space (Angel 2006), or by spraying cooling sulphate particle concentrations in the stratosphere (Crutzen 2006)—or by removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere—for instance, by increasing carbon sequestration with iron fertilisation of the oceans (Buesseler and Boyd 2003). These various potential geo-engineering implementations seem to do nothing but follow the baseline of the gigantic machination, the subjugation of things into orderable reserve commanded to stand by so that they may be manipulated by the operations of calculation. Even though such geo-engineering may eventually mitigate the negative consequences of climate change, it offers a calculative moulding of the even more complex systems of orderings as a solution to the problem of global warming, which is itself subordinate to, as well as an outcome of, this manipulative and calculative subjugation of earth, the logic of circular self-overcoming in the ever-greater modalities of exploitative power. As Malpas (2006:298) writes, although it is evident that more complex systems of orderings also increase the possibilities of their failure, machination always presents itself as a source for continuous improvements by simply viewing these failures as an indication of a further need for technological perfection. In other words, machination does not implicate an achievement of total ordering, but a drive towards total ordering where this drive itself is never under suspicion. Nevertheless, as contemporary climate change indicates, earth never allows itself to become captured, completely controlled or emptied into unfolding that frames it in terms of orderable and exploitable standing reserve. Earth rather resists all attempts to capture it: it resists by pointing out the lack that leads to the failure of all systems of orderings. It is precisely this lack, the line of failure that has always already started to flee the perfect rationalisation and total capture of things, which presents the earth aspect of Heidegger. Instead of the calculative engineering of technical solutions, non-violent resistance allows the earth to become a source of abyssal being, a source of self-emerging things that always retains a hidden element since the earth never allows itself to become completely secured though particular world-disclosures (see Harrison 2007:628; Peters and Irwin 2002:8). In other words, instead of mere calculative manipulation, we can resist the manipulative machination of earth and thus let the living earth become a source of abyssal being, an earth-site for our dwelling.

**Global Warming is a symptom of the technological enframing—the affirmative merely treats the symptom rather than the causes.**

**Backhaus 09** (4/20/09 \*\* Gary, Loyola College in Maryland, Department of phenomenologist that works in the fields of the human and social sciences, humanities, and fine arts.; “Automobility: Global Warming as Symptomatology”, MDPI journal, http://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/1/2/187/pdf)

My fundamental criticism, however, is that Gore sees global warming as the problem rather than as a symptom of a much deeper flaw/problematic in culture, and this delimits his thinking to remain within a shallow ecological viewpoint, foiling an analysis that would develop toward a viable sustainability. His focus on global warming limits his solution to the environmental crisis to a shallow technological fix. Sure he advocates a change in forms of life, but these are merely a function of, or the requirement for, the implementation of technologies that will save us and the planet. In this way his thinking remains within the modern scientistic attitude that in a deep or foundational sense has led to the predicament in which we find ourselves [10]. The efforts to dominate nature, dominations implemented through modern technological praxes, have led to drastic changes to the planet as a whole in an extremely short time. We now see that those changes, based on considering our needs only (the mentality of natural resources to be ordered about on our terms), are destroying the life of, and on, the planet. In this paper I will treat global warming as a symptom and address that which I have been calling automobility‟ as the true source of the problem of global warming. Global warming is the most apparent symptom of automobility, but at the same time global warming dangerously averts our attention away from discovering the real cure for our “dis-ease”, and from a complex of interrelated dangerous and egregious problems, which are to be confronted through an archaeological hermeneutics that traces back to the interpretive ground from which the complex manifests. Specifically, if we want to address environmental problems for the purpose of developing a policy of sustainability, we will need to critically reflect on automobility as the fundamental principle of modern material culture from which our environmental problems have ensued. Thus global warming is a jumping off point, a kind of leading clue to engage in a deeper way of thinking, which is required for the development of the concept of sustainability, from which we then are to be drawn to develop a new and viable worldview from the seed concept of sustainability. There can be no viable policies of sustainability without dealing with the egregious obstacle of an auto-mobile material culture.

**Calculative thinking enslaves humans to tech**

**Heidegger 66** –Professor of Philosophy @ University of Friedberg [Excerpt from: Martin Heidegger, “Memorial Address” in Discourse on Thinking, trans. John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund. New York: Harper and Row, 1966: 44-46. MV]

This is due to a revolution in leading concepts which has been going on for the past several centuries, and by which man is placed in a different world. This radical revolution in outlook has come about in modern philosophy. From this arises a completely new relation of man to the world and his place in it. The world now appears as an object open to the attacks of calculative thought, attacks that nothing is believed able any longer to resist. Nature becomes a gigantic gasoline station, an energy source for modern technology and industry. This relation of man to the world as such, in principle a technical one, developed in the seventeenth century first and only in Europe. It long remained unknown in other continents, and it was altogether alien to former ages and histories. The power concealed in modern technology determines the relation of man to that which exists. It rules the whole earth. Indeed, already man is beginning to advance beyond the earth into outer space. In not quite twenty years, such gigantic sources of power have become known through the discovery of atomic energy that in the foreseeable future the world's demands for energy of any kind will be ensured forever. Soon the procurement of the new energies will no longer be tied to certain countries and continents, as is the occurrence of coal, oil, and timber. In the foreseeable future it will be possible to build atomic power stations anywhere on earth. Thus the decisive question of science and technology today is no longer: Where do we find sufficient quantities of fuel? The decisive question now runs: In what way can we tame and direct the unimaginably vast amounts of atomic energies, and so secure mankind against the danger that these gigantic energies suddenly even without military actions break out somewhere, "run away" and destroy everything? If the taming of atomic energy is successful, and it will be successful, then a totally new era of technical development will begin. What we know now as the technology of film and television, of transportation and especially air transportation, of news reporting, and as medical and nutritional technology, is 3 presumably only a crude start. No one can foresee the radical changes to come. But technological advance will move faster and faster and can never be stopped. In all areas of his existence, man will be encircled ever more tightly by the forces of technology. These forces, which everywhere and every minute claim, enchain, drag along, press and impose upon man under the form of some technical contrivance or otherthese forces, since man has not made them, have moved long since beyond his will and have outgrown his capacity for decision. But this too is characteristic of the new world of technology, that its accomplishments come most speedily to be known and publicly admired. Thus today everyone will be able to read what this talk says about technology in any competently managed picture magazine or hear it on the radio. Butit is one thing to have heard and read something, that is, merely to take notice: it is another thing to understand what we have heard and read, that is, to ponder. The international meeting of Nobel Prize winners took place again in the summer of this year of 1955 in Lindau. There the American chemist, Stanley, had this to say: "The hour is near when life will be placed in the hands of the chemist who will be able to synthesize, split and change living substance at will." We take notice of such a statement. We even marvel at thc daring of scientific research, without thinking about it. We do not stop to consider that an attack with technological means is being prepared upon the life and nature of man compared with which the explosion of the hydrogen bomb means little. For precisely if the hydrogen bombs do not explode and human life on earth is preserved, an uncanny change in the world moves upon us. Yet it is not that the world is becoming entirely technical which is really uncanny. Far more uncanny is our being unprepared for this transformation, our inability to confront meditatively what is really dawning in this age. No single man, no group of men, no commission of prominent statesmen, scientists, and technicians, no conference of leaders of commerce and industry, can brake or direct the progress of history in the atomic age. No merely human organization is capable of gaining dominion over it. Is man, then, a defenseless and perplexed victim at the mercy of the irresistible superior power of technology? He would be if man today abandons any intention to pit meditative thinking decisively against merely calculative thinking. But once meditative thinking awakens, it must be at work unceasingly and on every last occasion.

**Our alternative it reject the calculative logic of the affirmative in favor of releasement**

**Our alternative isn’t a fatalistic rejection of technology—rejection is a form of releasement that reorients our relationship towards technological modes of thought**

**Botha 02** (Catherine, Dept. of Philosophy @ Univ. of Pretoria, “Heidegger, Technology and Ecology,” South African Journal of Philosophy, Vol 22, Issue 2, p. ebscohost)

Homelessness is the mood of the technological age. Rediscovering our worldly home as threatened, signals the “restoring surmounting” of technology. Memory or recollective thought chiefly summons this sense of a threatened sanctuary. Recollecting our worldly habitat not only fosters resistance to Das Gestell, but also Provides guidance in how human being relates to the products of technology. Heidegger acknowledges that we need not reject the products or skills of technology. He says that we can not repudiate the technological world of to day as the “work of the devil”, nor should we destroy it, assuming that it does not do this to it self (Heidegger, 1993:330). Heidegger does not advocate a retreat to a pre-technological state of being, nor does he suggest that we fatalistically re sign our selves to the victory of Das Gestell. **Fatalism is no answer because it reflects the same absence of thought that is evidenced in a naive complacency with technological progress**. We can say both “yes” and “no” to technology **by having an attitude of releasement toward things**. In other words, although it is crucial to perceive the danger of our technological constructions lest they dominate us, it is unnecessary to reject them completely. The alternative to be coming slaves of our own machines is not simply to become their masters. **The goal is to integrate technology within a bounded worldly dwelling no longer ordered by possessive mastery**. The attitude required to free ourselves from possessive mastery and achieve an appropriate relation to technology is one of **awaiting and receiving**, openness and releasement. Releasement towards things and openness to the mystery **grant us the possibility of dwelling in the world in a different way**: a way where the mood of homelessness has been displaced. **Until this occurs, our attempts to control the products of technology will only sustain our subordination to it**. The irony is that the “freedom” that has been nurtured for two and a half millennia in the West has encouraged this technological servitude.

# Case

**Warming is slow and won’t cause extinction**

**NIPCC 11** Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change Surviving the unprecedented climate change of the IPCC. 8 March 2011. <http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2011/mar/8mar2011a5.html>

In a paper published in *Systematics and Biodiversity*, Willis *et al*. (2010) consider the IPCC (2007) "predicted climatic changes for the next century" -- i.e., their contentions that "global temperatures will increase by 2-4°C and possibly beyond, sea levels will rise (~1 m ± 0.5 m), and atmospheric CO2will increase by up to 1000 ppm" -- noting that it is "widely suggested that the magnitude and rate of these changes will result in many plants and animals going extinct," citing studies that suggest that "within the next century, over 35% of some biota will have gone extinct (Thomas *et al*., 2004; Solomon *et al*., 2007) and there will be extensive die-back of the tropical rainforest due to climate change (e.g. Huntingford *et al*., 2008)." On the other hand, they indicate that some biologists and climatologists have pointed out that "many of the predicted increases in climate have happened before, in terms of both magnitude and rate of change (e.g. Royer, 2008; Zachos *et al*., 2008), and yet biotic communities have remained remarkably resilient (Mayle and Power, 2008) and in some cases thrived (Svenning and Condit, 2008)." But they report that those who mention these things are often "placed in the 'climate-change denier' category," although the purpose for pointing out these facts is simply to present "a sound scientific basis for understanding biotic responses to the magnitudes and rates of climate change predicted for the future through using the vast data resource that we can exploit in fossil records." Going on to do just that, Willis *et al*. focus on "intervals in time in the fossil record when atmospheric CO2 concentrations increased up to 1200 ppm, temperatures in mid- to high-latitudes increased by greater than 4°C within 60 years, and sea levels rose by up to 3 m higher than present," describing studies of past biotic responses that indicate "the scale and impact of the magnitude and rate of such climate changes on biodiversity." And what emerges from those studies, as they describe it, "is evidence for rapid community turnover, migrations, development of novel ecosystems and thresholds from one stable ecosystem state to another." And, most importantly in this regard, they report "there is very little evidence for broad-scale extinctions due to a warming world." In concluding, the Norwegian, Swedish and UK researchers say that "based on such evidence **we urge some caution in assuming broad-scale extinctions of species will occur due solely to climate changes of the magnitude and rate predicted for the next century**," reiterating that "the fossil record indicates remarkable **biotic resilience** to wide amplitude fluctuations in climate."

#### No modeling in China – it’s structurally impossible

Downs 8

Eric, Fellow @ Brookings, China Energy Fellow, Foreign Policy, John L. Thornton China Center U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission, China’s Energy Policies and Their Environmental Impacts, http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2008/0813\_china\_downs.aspx

China suffers from a disconnect between the increasingly prominent position of energy issues on its domestic and foreign policy agendas and the capacity of the country’s institutions to manage the energy sector. Some Chinese commentators have even argued that the biggest threat to China’s energy security is posed by the very institutions responsible for enhancing it. Consequently, restructuring China’s energy policymaking apparatus has been a subject of intense debate in recent years as the country has grappled with an unexpected surge in energy demand, growing dependence on energy imports, rising global energy prices and periodic domestic energy supply shortages. Authority over China’s energy sector at the national level is fractured among more than a dozen government agencies, the most important of which is the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). Within the NDRC itself, responsibility for energy is similarly scattered among multiple departments. Prior to the restructuring in March 2008, the key component was the Energy Bureau, which had a broad mandate but lacked the authority, tools and manpower to fulfill it. In 2005, the government added another cook to the kitchen with the establishment of the National Energy Leading Group, an advisory body headed by Premier Wen Jiabao. While the leading group’s creation reflected recognition of the need to strengthen energy sector management, it did not eradicate China’s energy governance woes. China’s fragmented energy policymaking structure has impeded energy governance because there is no single institution, such as a Ministry of Energy, with the authority to coordinate the interests of the various stakeholders. For example, the implementation of energy laws is hampered by the fact that those laws often do not specify the government agencies responsible for implementation because of disputes over who should be in charge. Similarly, the fuel tax that the NPC approved in 1999 has not been implemented because of the failure of the relevant stakeholders to reach an agreement. The policy paralysis within the energy bureaucracy stands in sharp contrast to the activism of China’s state-owned energy companies. These firms are powerful and relatively autonomous actors. Their influence is derived from their full and vice ministerial ranks, the membership of some top executives in the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, industry expertise, internationally listed subsidiaries and profitability (at least until recently). More often than not, it is China’s energy firms who initiate major energy projects and policies that are later embraced by the government, such as the West-East Pipeline and the acquisition of foreign energy assets. The companies also have some capacity to advance corporate interests at the expense of national ones. For example, oil and power generating companies have periodically reduced their output to pressure the government to raise the state-set prices of refined products and electricity, which have not kept pace with increases in the market-determined prices of crude oil and coal. Similarly, China’s national oil companies have ignored guidance from the central government about where they should invest overseas. II. China’s “new” energy policymaking structure The recent changes to China’s energy policymaking apparatus are the latest in a series of institutional reforms aimed at improving energy governance. In March 2008, the NPC approved two additions to China’s energy bureaucracy – the State Energy Commission (SEC) and the National Energy Administration (NEA). The SEC, a high-level discussion and coordination body whose specific functions, organization and staffing have not yet been determined, will replace the National Energy Leading Group. The daily affairs of the SEC will be handled by the NEA, a vice-ministerial component of the NDRC, which is the successor to the NDRC’s Energy Bureau. In addition to the Energy Bureau, the NEA is also comprised of other energy offices from the NDRC, the Office of the National Leading Group, and the nuclear power administration of the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense. The NEA has a broad mandate, which includes managing the country’s energy industries, drafting energy plans and policies, negotiating with international energy agencies and approving foreign energy investments. The NEA, like its predecessor, will struggle to fulfill its mandate because it lacks the authority, autonomy, manpower and tools to deal with the country’s energy challenges. Although the NEA’s capabilities in each of these areas are greater than those possessed by the NDRC Energy Bureau, they still fall short of what the NEA needs to do its job. Authority: The NEA has more political clout than its predecessor, but not enough to mitigate the bureaucratic infighting that undermines energy decision-making. The NEA is a vice-ministerial body, which is a step above that of the Energy Bureau, which was a bureau-level organization. However, the NEA still does not have the authority it needs to coordinate the interests of ministries, commissions and state-owned energy companies. One of the frustrations of officials in the NDRC Energy Bureau was that the energy companies often undercut their authority by circumventing the Bureau to hold face-to-face discussions with China’s senior leadership. The authority of the NEA is somewhat enhanced by the appointment of Zhang Guobao, a Vice-Chairman of the NDRC with full ministerial rank, as head of the NEA. While it was widely expected that Zhang would retire, his new position is a reflection of his substantial energy expertise. Zhang, who has worked at the NDRC since 1983, is a smart and skillful bureaucrat with encyclopedic knowledge of China’s energy sector. He has overseen the development of some of the country’s major infrastructure projects, including the West-East Pipeline, the transmission of electricity from west to east, the Qinghai-Tibet Railway and the expansion of Beijing Capital International Airport. Autonomy: The NEA is a creature of the NDRC. Some Chinese media reports speculated that the fact that the NEA’s offices will be separate from those of the NDRC and that the NEA will have its own Party Group – which will give the NEA greater autonomy in managing its affairs, including personnel decisions – are signs of the NEA’s independence. However, the fact that Zhang Guobao – an NDRC “lifer” – is head of the NEA and its Party Group indicates that the NEA’s room to maneuver will be constrained by the NDRC. Moreover, the NEA’s independence is limited by the fact that key tools it needs to effectively manage the energy sector are in the hands of the NDRC. Tools: Arguably the greatest constraint on the NEA’s ability to fulfill its mandate is the fact that is does not possess the authority to set energy prices, which remain the purview of the NDRC’s Pricing Department. The issue of who would end up with the power to determine energy prices was, in the words of Zhang Guobao, a subject of “constant dispute” during the bureaucratic reorganization. Although the NEA can make suggestions about energy price adjustments and should be consulted by the NDRC on any proposed changes, the shots are still being called by the NDRC (and ultimately the State Council, whose approval is needed for any major energy price changes). The fact that the NDRC retained control over energy prices is hardly surprising. The power to set prices is one of the NDRC’s main instruments of macroeconomic control, which it understandably is reluctant to relinquish, especially to a subordinate component which might be tempted to adjust energy prices in ways that run counter to broader NDRC objectives, such as combating inflation. The NEA’s lack of authority over energy prices makes its task of mitigating the current electricity shortages, which are partly rooted in price controls, especially challenging. Electricity prices are set by the state, while coal prices are determined by the market. The failure of electricity price increases to keep pace with soaring coal prices has contributed to the national power shortage because some electricity producers can't afford coal while others are unwilling to operate at a loss. With no pricing power, the NEA has little choice but to resort to administrative measures to achieve an objective that would be more effectively realized by raising and ultimately liberalizing electricity prices. Personnel: The central government is still managing the energy sector with a skeleton crew. Contrary to rumors that the NEA’s staff would be as large as 200, it ended up with just 112 people. This staff quota is certainly larger than that of the NDRC Energy Bureau, which had only 50 people, but it does not represent a major increase in the number of people directly involved in managing the energy sector at the national level. Moreover, some Chinese media reports have speculated that the NEA may face the problem of “too many generals and not enough soldiers” because at least half of the 112 slots at the NEA are for positions at the deputy department head level and above. The Party organ that determines the functions, internal structure and staff quotas for government institutions probably resisted calls for more personnel out of concern that if it approved a large staff for the NEA, then other government bodies would also press for more manpower at a time when the State Council is trying to streamline the bureaucracy. In sum, China’s new energy administration is unlikely to substantially improve energy governance. The organizational changes are tantamount to rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic. Although the energy bureaucracy looks a bit different, its limited capacities remain largely unchanged. Consequently, we can expect to see a continuation of business as usual: conflicts of interest will impede decision-making; the energy companies will remain important drivers of projects and policies; state-set energy prices will continue to contribute to periodic domestic energy supply shortfalls; and the NEA, with no authority to adjust energy prices, probably will resort to “second best” administrative

#### China is the largest emitter of CO2

Chen et al 10Chen, Qian, Peridas, Qiu, Ho: Natural Resources Defense Council, Friedmann: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Li, Wei: Institute of Rock and Soil Mechanics, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Sung, Fowler: Clean Air Task Force, Seligsohn, Liu, Forbes: World Resources Institute, Zhang: China Tsinghua University, Zhao: Institute of Engineering Thermophysics, Chinese Academy of Sciences (Jason Chen, Jingjing Qian, George Peridas, Yueming Qiu, Bruce Ho, Julio Friedmann, Xiaochun Li, Ning Wei, S. Ming Sung, Mike Fowler, Deborah Seligsohn, Yue Liu, Sarah Forbes, Dongjie Zhang, Lifeng Zhao, December 2010, “Identifying Near-Term Opportunities For Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) in China,” <http://docs.nrdc.org/international/files/int_10121001a.pdf)//DR>. H

After three decades of rapid industrialization fueled by coal, China is now the world’s biggest emitter of carbon dioxide (CO2)—the pollutant most responsible for global warming.1 This economic growth has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, and millions more could gain from further economic development. Yet continued reliance on coal-fired power threatens to create a climate catastrophe.

Doesn’t solve globally – their modeling ev doesn’t actually say other countries will agree and tag on

#### Renewables can’t solve warming – they supplement, not replace, dirty energy

**Angus 12** – ecosocialist advocate, citing an extensive study by Richard York, professor at the University of Oregon with an MS in Environmental Studies from Bemidji State University (Iran, “Green energy won’t save the earth without social change”, 3/21/12; < [http://climateandcapitalism.com/2012/03/21/green-energy-alone-wont-save-the-earth/>)//Beddow](http://climateandcapitalism.com/2012/03/21/green-energy-alone-wont-save-the-earth/%3e)//Beddow)

The most popular techno-fix for global warming is green energy. If energy companies would only deploy wind, hydro, solar, geothermal or nuclear, then emission-intensive fossil fuels will eventually disappear. But will that actually work? A new study by Richard York of the University of Oregon shows that it isn’t that simple. Rather than displacing fossil fuels, green energy sources have proven to be mostly additive**.** “Do alternative energy sources displace fossil fuels?” published this month in Nature Climate Change, discusses what happened when alternative energy sources were introduced in countries around the world, over the past fifty years. Contrary to the accepted wisdom that new green energy replaces fossil-fuel use, York found that on average each unit of energy use from non-fossil-fuel sources displaced less than a quarter of a unit of energy use from fossil-fuel sources. The picture is worse with electricity, where each new unit generated from green sources displaced less than one-tenth of a unit of fossil-fuel-generated electricity**.** York writes: “Based on all of the results presented above, the answer to the question presented in the title of this paper – do alternative energy sources displace fossil fuels? – is yes, but only very modestly. The common assumption that the expansion of production of alternative energy will suppress fossil-fuel energy production in equal proportion is clearly wrong.” Why don’t the new sources replace the old? York identifies two key reasons: the inertia of a huge existing fossil-fuel infrastructure, and the power and influence of the coal and oil corporations. “The failure of non-fossil energy sources to displace fossil ones is probably in part attributable to the established energy system where there is a lock-in to using fossil fuels as the base energy source because of their long-standing prevalence and existing infrastructure and to the political and economic power of the fossil-fuel industry.” In other words, eliminating fossil-fuel as an energy source is at least as much a social and political problem as a technical one. “Of course all societies need energy. So, obviously, if societies are to stop using fossil fuels they must have other energy sources. However, the results from the analyses presented here indicate that the shift away from fossil fuel does not happen inevitably with the expansion of non-fossil-fuel sources, or at least in the political and economic contexts that have been dominant over the past fifty years around the world…. “The most effective strategy for curbing carbon emissions is likely to be one that aims to not only develop non-fossil energy sources, but also to find ways to alter political and economic contexts so that fossil-fuel energy is more easily displaced and to curtail the growth in energy consumption as much as possible. “A general implication of these findings is that polices aimed at addressing global climate change should not focus principally on developing technological fixes, but should also take into account human behaviour in the context of political, economic and social systems.” The evidence shows that simply introducing green energy isn’t enough: the introduction must be accompanied by “explicit policies aimed at reducing carbon emissions.” The article is published in a scientific journal, where political and social conclusions can only be expressed in muted form. But Richard York’s research and conclusions reinforce the argument that he and his co-authors (John Bellamy Foster and Brett Clark) made more explicitly in their recent book, The Ecological Rift: Capitalism’s War on the Planet. “We are confronting the question of a terminal crisis, threatening most life on the planet, civilization, and the very existence of future generations. … attempts to solve this through technological fixes, market magic, and the idea of a ‘sustainable capitalism’ are mere forms of ecological denial, since they ignore the inherent destructiveness of the current system of unsustainable development – capitalism.”

#### Renewables won’t catch on– either market forces will drive innovation absent the aff, or the plan can’t stimulate investment.

**Taylor and Van Doren 11** – critic of federal energy and environmental policy, Wall Street Journal Contributor, served on congressional advisory bodies, member of International Association for Energy economics, writer for *The Energy Journal,* testified in Congress / editor of the quarterly journal *Regulation* and expert in the regulation of energy and environment, taught at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, School of Organization and Management at Yale University, and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, former postdoctoral fellow in political economy at Carnegie Mellon University (Jerry and Peter, “The Green Energy Economy Reconsidered” 4/25/11; < [http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/green-energy-economy-reconsidered>)//Beddow](http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/green-energy-economy-reconsidered%3e)//Beddow)

Let’s assume, however, that we could afford that. Have we ever seen such a “green economy”? Yes we have; in the 13th century. Renewable energy is quite literally the energy of yesterday. Few seem to realize that we abandoned “green” energy centuries ago for five very good reasons. First, green energy is diffuse, and **it takes a tremendous amount of land and material to harness even a little bit of energy**. Jesse Ausubel, director of the Program for the Human Environment and senior research associate at Rockefeller University, calculates, for instance, that the entire state of Connecticut (that is, if Connecticut were as windy as the southeastern Colorado plains) would need to be devoted to wind turbines to power the city of New York. Second, **it is extremely costly.** In 2016 President Obama’s own Energy Information Administration estimates that onshore wind (the least expensive of these green energies) will be **80% more expensive than combined cycle, gas-fired electricity.** And that doesn’t account for the costs associated with the **hundreds of billions of dollars worth of new transmission systems that would be necessary to get wind and solar energy — which is generally produced far from where consumers happen to live — to ratepayers. Third, it is unreliable. The wind doesn’t always blow and the sun doesn’t always shine when the energy is needed**. We account for that today by having a lot of coal and natural gas generation on “standby” to fire-up when renewables can’t produce. Incidentally, the cost of maintaining this backup generation is likewise never fully accounted for in the cost estimates associated with green energy. But in a world where fossil fuels are a thing of the past, we would be forced — like the peasants of the Dark Age — to rely upon the vagaries of the weather. Fourth, it is scarce. While wind and sunlight are obviously not scarce, **the real estate where those energies are reliably continuous and in economic proximity to ratepayers is scarce.** Finally, **once the electricity is produced by the sun or wind, it cannot be stored because battery technology is not currently up to the task**. Hence, we must immediately “use it or lose it.” **Fossil fuels are everything that green energy is not.** Approximately 1,000 cubic feet of natural gas (which cost approximately $4.00) can generate the same amount of electricity as running an average rooftop solar system for 131 days. It is comparatively cheap. It is reliable; it will burn and produce energy whenever you want it. It is plentiful (we use only a tiny bit of oil in the electricity sector). And you can store fossil fuels until you need them. Proponents of green energy argue that if the government can put a man on the moon, it can certainly make green energy economically attractive. Well, notice that government was not trying to get a man to the moon profitably, which is more akin to the challenge here. Even before the Obama presidency began, about half the production costs of wind and solar energy were underwritten by the taxpayer to no commercial avail. There’s little reason to think that a more sustained, multi-decade commitment to subsidy would play out any differently. After all, the federal government once promised that nuclear energy was on the cusp of being “too cheap to meter.” That was in the 1950s. Sixty-one billion dollars of subsidies and impossible-to-price regulatory preferences later, it’s still the most expensive source of conventional energy on the grid. The fundamental question that green energy proponents must answer is this: if green energy is so inevitable and such a great investment, why do we need to subsidize it? If and when renewable energy makes economic sense, profit-hungry investors will build all that we need for us without government needing to lift a finger. But **if it doesn’t make economic sense, all of the subsidies in the world won’t change that fact.**